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Abstract 
Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon and encouraging tax compliance is an 
important and much debated policy issue. Many studies have shown that tax cheating has 
to be attributed to a considerable extent to the tax morale of taxpayers. The aim of the 
present paper is to shed light on the relationship between the taxpayer and the public 
sector. Specifically, we investigate whether public spending inefficiency shapes individual 
tax morale. Combining data from Italian municipalities’ balance sheets with individual 
data from a properly designed survey on tax morale, we find that the attitude towards 
paying taxes is better when resources are spent more efficiently. This does not appear to be 
due to some confounding factors at the municipality level or to spatial sorting of citizens. It 
is also robust to alternative measures of both inefficiency and tax morale. 
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1  Introduction
1 
Tax evasion is a pervasive and widespread phenomenon that entails important 
economic and social consequences. It reduces public revenues with effects in 
terms of the balance sheet. Moreover, it creates horizontal inequity because 
equally well-off people end up with different tax burdens; this, in turn, distorts the 
redistributive effect of taxation and undermines social cohesion. Therefore, 
understanding the main determinants of tax compliance is a major economic and 
political issue. According to a consolidated view, taxpayers decide whether and 
how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision 
or gamble (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, as stressed by a large tide of 
recent research, the expected penalization is unsatisfactory in explaining the tax 
evasion evidence, and the paradigm of a rational and selfish agent appears to be 
inadequate (Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod, 2007). To solve the puzzle, several 
economists emphasize the role of tax morale – defined as the individual intrinsic 
motivation to comply with fiscal obligations – in explaining tax evasion.  
The aim of the present paper is to shed further light on the determinants of 
tax morale by investigating the role of public sector and, in particular, of its 
inefficiency in providing public goods. We do so by exploiting the heterogeneity 
of public spending inefficiency across Italian municipalities. Namely, we examine 
whether taxpayers living in municipalities where public spending is highly 
inefficient show lower tax morale. Our measure of public spending inefficiency is 
based on a stochastic frontier model using information on expenditures and 
various output indicators for a panel of Italian municipalities. Individual tax 
morale is calculated by combining through a principal component analysis a 
variety of information on public spirit and taxation taken from a special section of 
the 2004 Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW hereafter) carried out 
by the Bank of Italy. 
We focus on tax morale rather than tax compliance for two main reasons. 
The first is more practical since it is very difficult (almost impossible) to observe 
tax compliance at the individual level whereas tax morale can be measured 
through properly designed surveys. The second refers to the interpretation of the 
potential findings: if we were able to estimate the effect of state efficiency on 
individual tax compliance, we would not know exactly how it occurred. It could 
have derived from a more cooperative behaviour of the taxpayers (because of the 
fairness of the fiscal exchange) but also from coercive policies – the more the 
state is efficient the more it is capable of auditing the taxpayers and, more 
generally, of applying rules and checking their effectiveness. Therefore, looking 
                                                 
1 We thank Friedrich Schneider, Pietro Tommasino, two anonymous referees and participants at 
the Bank of Italy seminars, the SIEP 2008 Conference and “Macroeconomic and Policy 
Implications of Underground Economy and Tax Evasion” 2009 Conference for useful comments. 
The views expressed herein are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
Correspondence: guglielmo.barone@bancaditalia.it; sauro.mocetti@bancaditalia.it.   6
at tax morale is a better way of identifying the impact of institutions on individual 
attitudes and preferences. 
Our empirical findings indicate that public spending inefficiency does 
negatively affect citizens’ tax morale. This evidence does not seem to be driven 
by some confounding factor at the municipality level or by spatial sorting of 
citizens and proves robust to accounting for alternative measures of both 
inefficiency and tax morale. This is an expected result since the efficient behavior 
of the public sector in the provision of public goods can stimulate a “cooperative” 
reaction of the taxpayer in the form of a better attitude towards her fiscal duties. 
For example, in the taxpayer’s cost-benefit calculation public spending 
inefficiency is equivalent to a waste of resources and implies a less favorable ratio 
between the supply of public goods and the taxes used to finance them. 
Consequently, the taxpayer may react with a lower propensity to pay taxes 
because of the unfairness of the fiscal exchange.
2 At the same time, ethical and 
social norms influence individual beliefs and behaviors: if there exists a “stigma” 
associated with tax evasion then an inefficient public sector may lower the 
psychological cost of cheating in terms of guilt, bad conscience, or bad 
reputation.
3 
We also find that the negative effect of inefficiency is larger if the level of 
public spending is lower and/or the degree of fiscal autonomy is higher. A 
possible interpretation of former additional result is that a lower level of public 
spending may generate resentment in the taxpayers who become more sensitive to 
how resources are spent. A larger autonomy of local authorities, in turn, increases 
the proximity between the taxpayer and the public sector so that citizens attach 
more responsibilities to municipalities and are more responsive to their spending 
efficiency. 
A growing number of papers have recently focused on the determinants of 
tax morale. Most of the literature analyzes how individual socioeconomic 
characteristics affect tax morale, whereas the evidence on the role of institutions is 
scant. Friedman et al. (2000), in a cross-country analysis, show that countries with 
more corruption and onerous bureaucracies have a larger share of unofficial 
economy. However, drawing conclusions from cross-country comparisons is 
difficult because institutional and cultural frameworks that typify specific 
countries might influence both the quality of institutions and the degree of tax 
morale and they cannot always be controlled for in a satisfactory manner. 
Many papers use microdata, mainly taken from the World Value Survey. 
Slemrod (2002) finds a negative correlation between the acceptability of tax 
evasion and confidence and trust in government. Alm and Torgler (2006) 
highlight the role of trust in both the legal system and parliament as affecting tax 
                                                 
2 Alm et al. (1992a, 1992b) found in laboratory experiments that tax compliance is greater when 
individuals perceive some benefits for their taxes. This relationship arises even when there is no 
chance of detection and punishment. See also Bordignon (1993) for a formal model on the 
relationship between governmental supply of public goods and the tax evasion decision. 
3 A number of studies since Elster (1989) have emphasized the role of social norms in explaining 
individual behavior.   7
morale, and Torgler (2005b) shows that trust in the president and his officials is 
positively associated with an individual’s propensity to pay taxes. The main 
limitation of these papers is that they generally base their inference on cross-
sectional individual data on both tax morale and trust in institutions. Therefore, 
the identification might be undermined by the potential presence of some 
individual-level omitted variable driving the observed correlation (e.g. the 
proclivity to respect the rules and the authority). Finally, some recent papers 
combine micro with aggregate data: Feld and Frey (2002) and Torgler (2005a) 
show that direct democratic rights have a significantly positive effect on tax 
morale. Güth et al. (2005) and Torgler and Werner (2005) analyze the relationship 
between fiscal autonomy and tax morale. Cannari and d’Alessio (2007) find that 
tax morale is negatively associated with province-level unemployment and crime 
rates and positively associated with social capital. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we extend 
previous research explicitly focusing on the relevant issue of the link between 
public spending inefficiency and tax morale. Second, we combine survey data on 
individual, subjective judgments about taxes with an objective measure of 
inefficiency at the municipality level, thus minimizing the risk of capturing a 
spurious correlation between the two variables of interest. Moreover, we think 
that Italy is a particularly interesting country to analyze. It performs poorly in 
terms of public sector efficiency: in an international comparison, it ranks 18th 
among 23 developed OECD countries (Afonso et al., 2005). Even more 
impressive, according to Schneider (2005), more than one-fourth of the official 
Italian GDP is hidden.  
Our paper is also partially related to other studies aimed at measuring and 
explaining the efficiency of municipalities (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; 
Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Afonso and Fernandes, 2006). With these studies we 
share the techniques used to compute our index of cost inefficiency; however, 
differently to most of this literature, we do not investigate the determinants of 
inefficiency as we are interested in its effect on tax morale. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and 
introduce our key variables. We show the results together with several robustness 
checks in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2  Data and variables 
Our dataset is built by combining individual data on tax morale and socio-
demographic characteristics from the SHIW with aggregate data on public 
expenditure and outputs taken from the balance sheets of Italian municipalities 
(NUTS5 in European terminology). In the following, we describe data sources 
and methodologies used to generate the two variables of main interest: tax morale 
and public spending inefficiency.   8
2.1  Tax morale 
Tax morale is defined as the attitude towards paying taxes, and we are able to 
measure it thanks to a properly designed survey conducted by the Bank of Italy.
4 
The 2004 issue of the SHIW contains an original section where a number of 
opinions regarding public spirit and taxation have been collected from a random 
sample of about half of the total sample of householders (3,798 observations). In 
the survey, there are a number of statements about the behavior of citizens and the 
respondents state, in an ordered scale, to what extent they agree with each of the 
statements.
5 Our indicator of tax morale is the first principal component of the 
following (correlated) six variables:
6  
 
(1) how much is justifiable “not paying for your ticket on public transport”. 
 
This variable, where the respondents’ choice is made on a (1–10) scale with 1 
being never justifiable and 10 being always justifiable, should capture the 
individual inclination to contribute to the provision of a local public good. The 
next four variables deal with the level of agreement of the respondents to a set of 
statements about Italy’s tax system. These variables, where the respondents’ 
choice is made on a (1–5) scale of with 1 being not at all and 5 being very much, 
are as follows: 
 
(2) “paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship”; 
(3) “not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because it 
harms the whole community”; 
(4) “it is right not to pay taxes if you think they are unfair”; 
(5) “even if someone thinks a tax is unfair, he/she should pay it first and then 
complain if necessary”. 
 
Variables (2) – (5) are likely to proxy an individual’s inclination to comply with 
fiscal obligations. Finally, we included the respondent’s opinion on 
 
(6) “it would be a good thing if tax inspections were made more often, or not”. 
 
The rationale for the last item is that those who do not comply with fiscal duties 
are likely those who are more sensitive to an increase in the probability of being 
caught. Table 1 contains a description of each item included in the principal 
                                                 
4  The Bank of Italy conducts this survey every two years on a representative sample of 
approximately 8,000 households. See Brandolini and Cannari (1994) for details. 
5 These types of questions should increase the reliability of the measure of tax morale: since they 
do not directly ask whether a person has evaded taxes, we expect the degree of honesty to be 
higher. 
6  See also Cannari and D’Alessio (2007) and Fiorio and Zanardi (2006) for slightly different 
measures of tax morale based on the same data. In Section 3.4, we show that our findings are 
robust to different measurements of tax morale.   9
component analysis. 
Our indicator of tax morale has two main advantages with respect to the 
existing literature. First, as usual in psychometric studies, it extracts information 
from various different dimensions of individual beliefs so it is a better measure of 
a multidimensional concept like tax morale. Second, in a multi-item index the 
random errors should tend to average out, thus producing a more reliable measure. 
The first principal component explains about 35 percent of the total variance of 
the underlying variables. In Table 2, we report some descriptive statistics. They 
show that tax morale is lower for those who belong to the lowest quartile of 
income distribution. Moreover, the propensity to pay taxes increases with 
education, and it is smaller for the self-employed than for employees. Finally, tax 
morale is lower in the South part of Italy.  
2.2  Local public spending inefficiency 
In this subsection, we estimate a measure of public spending inefficiency 
for Italian municipalities by using a stochastic frontier model (Aigner et al., 1977; 
Meeusen and van den Broek, 1977). We postulate the existence of a cost frontier 
that characterizes the minimum expenditure required to produce a specified 
bundle of public goods given a common technology available to all 
municipalities. This deterministic representation of the technology is augmented 
with a two-sided error term, composed of a traditional symmetric, random-noise 
component and a skewed and nonnegative inefficiency component. The former 
represents the effects of random variation in the data generating process in the 
spirit of the traditional least-squares-based approach while the latter captures the 
inefficiency of the production process that is the excess of expenditures a 
municipality sustains to deliver a certain bundle of public goods. The estimation 
of a stochastic frontier requires the choice of an explicit functional form for the 
cost function. Since the shape of this function is unknown, we choose a highly 
flexible translog-type specification. Thus, our model can be written as follows: 




j jmt imt ij
n
i imt i mt q q q C ε μ η λ α α α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ == = ) ( 11 1 0 ln ln ln ln  
where  mt C ln  is the natural logarithm of the total current cost that municipality m 
bore in year t to provide public goods qi;  t λ  are year fixed effects, and  ) (m r η  are 
fixed effects at the level of the region r where municipality m is located.
7  
                                                 
7 In Italy, there are more than 8,000 municipalities and 20 regions. The introduction of regional-
fixed effects helps us to control for any idiosyncratic region-level factors affecting total cost, 
including the unobserved quality of public goods. In fact, we are confident that in the Italian 
context spatial heterogeneity in the quality of public goods is large between regions, but small 
within them. Note also that our specification does not include input prices since they are 
unavailable in the sample at our disposal. However, this is quite standard in literature and, again, 
the inclusion of region-level fixed effect can help in accounting for territorial variability of input 
prices.    10
In this model, deviations from the deterministic frontier are decomposed into a 
positive inefficiency effect,  ( )
2 , μ σ μ μ
+ ∼ N
iid
m , and a usual error term, 
()
2 , 0 e
iid
mt N σ ε ∼ , where μm and εmt are distributed independently of each other and 
the covariates in the model. The assumption that cost inefficiency is time invariant 
seems reasonable given the small number of years considered and the strong 
degree of persistence of inefficiency across time. In this context, our measure of 
municipality-level public spending inefficiency (PSI) is given by E{exp(μm)|εmt}.
8 
Estimation is based on a unique dataset that contains measures of inputs 
and outputs taken from the balance sheets of Italian municipalities. These data 
include detailed measures of revenues and expenditures together with the outputs 
produced. Data are gathered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and cover all years 
starting from 2001.
9 We restrict our attention to the 2001–2004 period because tax 
morale from the SHIW is measured in 2004, and we want inefficiency to be at 
least predetermined with respect to tax morale. 
The selection of the n outputs is based on the minimum number of services 
that must be provided by each municipality. Specifically, local authorities are 
responsible for public street lighting, waste collection, nursery schools, surfacing 
of public roads, and a number of services related to the electoral list, vital 
statistics, national service, and so on. In Table 3, we present a full description of 
both inputs and outputs. 
Our data have three main advantages with respect to the existing papers 
that measure inefficiency in municipalities. First, other studies measure 
municipalities’ outputs with crude proxy variables such as population; on this 
point, our database allows us to define precise measures of outputs for each public 
good considered. Second, thanks to the panel dimension of the data, our measure 
is less sensitive to municipality-year idiosyncratic shocks or measurement errors 
that may undermine cross-section estimates. Third, the large amount of 
observations gives us the degree of freedom necessary to estimate a very flexible 
translog-type functional form instead of a more parsimonious but less flexible 
Cobb-Douglas. Thus, we can partially overcome the main disadvantage of a 
parametric approach, which is imposing a certain functional form to the 
technology. 
Administrative data are not immune to imputation errors and other sources 
of noise. In order to clean the data, we check their internal consistency by 
computing the ratio between each input and the corresponding output, and then by 
trimming all the observations having values less than the first percentile and 
greater than the last percentile. We iterate this procedure for each item reported in 
                                                 
8 See Battese and Coelli (1992) for computational details. 
9 The current account standards of municipal balance sheets have been introduced at the end of the 
nineties, in order to better monitor local public spending in the frame of the internal stability pact. 
Each municipality must detail main categories of expenditures and revenues, according to standard 
models authorized by Ministry of Internal Affairs. They are available electronically since 2001. 
See http://finanzalocale.interno.it/sitophp/home_finloc.php?Titolo=Certificati+Consuntivi.   11
Table 3.
10 Because of missing data and dropped outliers, we are ultimately able to 
compute our inefficiency indicator for 1,458 municipalities out of 8,115. One 
could argue that this loss of observations might undermine the representativeness 
of our sample and, consequently, the external validity of our estimates. However, 
as shown in Figure 1, the distribution of our sample by geographical area is very 
similar to that of the universe of Italian municipalities. As far as the size is 
concerned, our sample is under-represented among small villages (with less than 
1,000 residents, see Figure 2), probably because they have more difficulties 
reporting detailed balance-sheet data. Note, however, that less than 2 percent of 
population lives in these villages. The rest of the distribution nearly follows that 
of the whole sample. All these figures make us confident that despite of the 
missing values in our inefficiency measure our findings can be credibly extended 
beyond the subset we use. 
Main summary statistics of all the explanatory variables are reported in 
Table 4. 
3  Empirical approach and results 
After constructing indicators for individual tax morale and local public spending 
inefficiency, we now turn to the estimation of the empirical relationship between 
the two variables. Our baseline specification is: 
() i i m r i m i i PSI X TM ε η δ β α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = )) ( (  
where TMi is the tax morale of the individual i who lives in municipality m(i); Xi 
contains individual attributes (age, age squared, income, occupation, education, 
etc.); PSIm(i) is our measure of public spending inefficiency at the municipal level; 
regional-fixed effects ηr(m(i)) account for any time-invariant and region-specific 
factor including the quality of those public goods whose production is organized 
at the regional level (e.g., health services) and/or goods delivered from the central 
state but whose quality may vary mainly across regions (e.g., public order). After 
merging individual data on tax morale with aggregate data on public spending 
efficiency – using the municipality where the individual resides as the key 
variable – the final sample contains 1,115 observations. 
It is worth noticing that we estimate the impact of inefficiency, that is 
measured at the municipal level, on tax morale that is based on a number of 
individual judgments not explicitly related to the local government or local 
taxation. However, resources collected by taxation are used to provide different 
public goods, including welfare and public services at the local level. Reasonably, 
the taxpayers’ propensity to pay taxes depends on the inefficiency of different 
institutional actors, such as the central government, the regions, and the 
                                                 
10 We also check for stronger conditions. In addition to the internal consistency described in the 
text, we trim outliers in the ratios between expenditure and population and between output 
indicators and population. Results are unaffected.   12
municipalities. In our cross-section framework inefficiency of central government 
is not identifiable while that of the 20 regional governments is hardly identifiable 
in a credible manner because of the low variability in the data and the high 
likelihood of obtaining a spurious correlation. Therefore, our identification 
strategy consists of exploiting the heterogeneity of inefficiency across 
municipalities and, at the same time, controlling with regional-fixed effects for 
any other potential source of taxpayer satisfaction derived from any interaction 
with other segments of the public sector. If our findings were valid also with 
respect to the other levels of government – and we think this is the case – our 
estimate could be interpreted as a lower bound of the overall effect of the 
inefficiency of the whole public sector. 
Two issues regarding our estimating  equation need to be mentioned. First, 
as shown by Moulton (1990) in a regression performed on micro units and 
including aggregated (in our case municipality-level) variables, the standard errors 
from OLS will be underestimated. To address this issue, we cluster standard errors 
at the municipality level. Second, standard errors are also bootstrapped (with 
1,000 replications) because PSIm(i) is a generated regressor. 
3.1  Baseline estimations 
Results of our basic regressions are reported in Table 5. The specification in 
column 1 includes proxies for the economic status and the sociodemographic 
characteristics of the individual, 20 regional-fixed effects and our measure of 
public spending inefficiency. 
Age has an inverse U-shaped relationship with TM, although the 
coefficient of second-degree term is not significant in all specifications. Gender 
appears not to be significant, whereas education has a weak positive association 
with tax morale: individuals with a higher-education level show a greater 
willingness to pay taxes. We also include controls for the economic status of the 
householders. Tax morale increases with disposable income, whereas the dummy 
for the self-employed enters with a negative sign, although it is not significant.
11 
More importantly, our measure of public spending inefficiency enters with the 
expected negative sign, and it is significant at the 1 percent level. Taxpayers 
interacting with a more efficient public sector are likely to show a higher level of 
tax morale. Our result can be interpreted by looking at the interaction between 
citizens and the government as a contractual relationship, implying duties and 
rights for each contract partner. If the taxpayer observes that the tax burden is not 
spent efficiently, he will feel cheated and his willingness to cooperate will fall. 
Looking for a preferred specification, in columns (2) to (5), we include a 
number of additional individual controls. In column (2), we introduce dummies 
for the birthplace area – northwest, northeast, center, south, and islands for those 
who are Italians and continents for those who come from abroad – to control for 
                                                 
11 We also included additional controls for the number of household components and dummies 
about the job qualification and sector of activity (not reported in the table).   13
cultural traits inherited from the region where the individual is born. In column 
(3), we add a dummy that is equal to 1 if the individual has taken part in social, 
environmental, or cultural associations. This dummy is intended to capture the 
individual proclivity to contribute to his local community. In column (4), we 
include a dummy that is equal to 1 if, in the individual’s view, the government 
should provide as many public services as possible, even if it implies increasing 
taxes – say a leftist orientation of the householder. Finally, in the last column, we 
consider the additional individual controls all together. We find that tax morale is 
higher for those who participate in social activities and those who are favorable to 
more state intervention in the economy. More importantly, the coefficient of PSI 
is unaffected. 
The role of PSI in shaping tax morale is economically relevant. For 
instance, according to our estimates in column (5), reducing inefficiency by one 
standard deviation would entail an increase in TM equal to 20 percent of its 
standard deviation. A similar exercise that simulates a reduction of PSI from the 
75th to the 25th percentile has a similar conclusion, confirming that the estimated 
effect is non-negligible. As already stated, since we can not estimate the effects at 
the other levels of the government, our estimates represent a lower bound of the 
impact of the inefficiency of the whole public sector. 
3.2  Identification issues 
Is it possible to interpret the evidence shown thus far in a causal sense? The 
answer is affirmative as long as the assumption of the exogeneity of PSI holds. 
However, there are three reasons why it may be not the case. 
First, some form of reverse causality may be at work. It may happen that 
lower tax morale leads to lower tax revenues and this, in turn, might affect 
efficiency (for example, forcing municipalities to manage more efficiently the 
resources available). If so, this would imply a positive relationship between tax 
morale and inefficiency, so that the size of the “real” negative effect would be 
even larger than that we estimate. However, in the Italian institutional setting, this 
channel is unlikely to be at work as local tax revenues account only for one fourth 
of the municipalities’ total revenues. More generally, we think that in our model 
the scope for reverse causality is negligible because of the joint use of an 
individual variable as dependent variable (TM) and an aggregate variable as a 
target regressor (PSI). Finally, PSI is computed on lagged data so further 
restricting the scope of some form of reverse causation.  
Second, and more importantly, the endogeneity of inefficiency may 
depend on a local omitted variable (e.g., public spirit) that constitutes a 
confounding factor driving the correlation between PSI and TM, absent any causal 
link between these two variables. A third source of endogeneity may be the spatial 
sorting of taxpayers across municipalities: it may happen that individuals with 
higher morale tend to move to cities that are characterized by higher efficiency in 
the provision of public goods. In this case, the estimated coefficient of PSI merely 
captures the location choices of taxpayers.   14
A traditional solution to these potential drawbacks is to resort to 
instrumental variable estimation. Unfortunately, in our case it is very unlikely to 
find a suitable and credible instrument for PSI, that is, a variable correlated to 
inefficiency but orthogonal to tax morale. In what follows, we discuss the 
alternative strategies we adopt to address these potential sources of endogeneity. 
Omitted variable bias. To minimize the omitted variable bias, we add a rich set of 
covariates including fixed effects at a finer partition of the territory. Specifically, 
we sequentially augment the regression in Table 5, column 5, with a number of 
variables measuring socioeconomic conditions and demographic characteristics of 
the municipalities where individual resides; moreover, we include provincial fixed 
effect (NUTS3 in Eurostat classification) in isolation and together with the other 
covariates (Table 6). 
We start by including the log of GDP per capita of the local labor market 
(LLM) which city m belongs to; it is aimed to capture the degree of economic 
development of the area and its impact on our variables of interest. We also 
control for the incidence of the service sector. The former has no effect on TM 
whereas the latter is weakly significant and has a negative sign. A further control 
is the size of the municipality where the individual resides, which can affect both 
the efficiency of local authorities (e.g., because of congestion costs or scale 
economies in the production of public goods) and the individual tax morale (e.g., 
in larger communities the number and the type of interactions vary, and this may 
affect an individual’s propensity to pay taxes). In our data the size of the 
municipality does not affect TM. To the contrary, the demographic structure of the 
population, as measured by the percentage of young individuals, negatively 
shapes TM. We control also for the incidence of foreign people since Luttmer 
(2001) finds that support for welfare is higher among people who live near many 
welfare recipients of the same race.
12   Therefore, we expect the individual 
propensity to comply with fiscal obligations to be lower in those municipalities 
where there are more foreign people; on the other hand, the presence of foreign 
people may have consequences for the activity of the local administration (e.g., 
issuing certificates etc.). This variable seems to play no role in determining 
individual tax morale. In all these specifications, the coefficient of PSI remains 
stable and highly significant. 
After the economic and demographic variables, our last set of controls 
includes those covariates that approximate the degree of civism at the local level. 
We start controlling for the local endowment of human capital as measured by the 
percentage of graduates among local residents. This may affect the efficiency of 
the municipality if it ensures that the local administrators are on average more 
qualified. Furthermore, if we admit that those who are better educated possess 
higher civic values, they may affect individual tax morale through peer pressure. 
The variable enters with a positive and significant coefficient; however, our 
finding on the PSI role remains unchanged. In addition, we include proxies for 
                                                 
12  The explanation is that individuals tend to have hostile reactions when they see welfare 
recipients who belong to a different ethnic group and sympathetic reactions otherwise.   15
social capital that may reasonably affect both tax morale and public spending 
inefficiency (e.g., through positive pressure on the activity of local authorities). 
Social capital is measured by using both the percentage of voters in the general 
elections and the share of people engaged as volunteers in the nonprofit sector. In 
both cases, social capital does not shape individual tax morale, and, more 
importantly, its inclusion does not significantly affect the coefficient of PSI.  
Finally, we push forward this kind of robustness checks and we introduce 
province-level fixed effects, in isolation of and jointly with all other covariates.
13 
Our finding on PSI is qualitatively confirmed. 
Overall, we believe the results reported above constitute a strong argument 
against the traditional omitted variable bias critique. We are aware that 
performing a randomized experiment would be ideal but, at the same time, it is 
hard to imagine the existence of some confounding factor that (i) is not correlated 
with any of the variables shown in Table 6 and (ii) varies within provinces. 
Spatial sorting. One may argue that our efficiency measure is endogenous 
because of spatial sorting of citizens. The argument is that a more efficient local 
administration can attract people with higher tax morale. If this is the case, the 
positive association we observe between tax morale and public spending 
efficiency is generated by the selective assignment of individuals to cities. To deal 
with this issue, we exploit the confidential SHIW data on the birthplace of 
workers. We define individuals as “stayers” if they live in the same province in 
which they were born and “movers” otherwise. 
To leave out selective migration of individuals with higher tax morale, we 
run the regression on the subsample of stayers. The coefficient of PSI is only 
partially affected, and it remains significantly different from zero at the 1 percent 
level (Table 7). Furthermore, to deal with the fact that the stayers are a selected 
sample of the population, we adopt a Heckman selection model. As exclusion 
restriction, we use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the house of residence 
was inherited and 0 otherwise. The rationale for this choice is that the propensity 
to move may be lower for those who inherit the house where they live since they 
would have to liquidate their housing asset in a given locality to buy a new house 
elsewhere, thus facing sizeable switching costs. Moreover, there may be 
intangible linkages between individuals and an inherited house that may affect the 
propensity to move. The coefficient of this variable in the selection equation is 
statistically different from zero, and the sign is negative as expected. More 
importantly, the role of PSI in shaping individual tax morale is confirmed. 
Alternatively, we considered the entire sample with the introduction of a 
new (dummy) variable that distinguishes stayers from movers. Our results show 
that movers do not have a tax morale significantly different from that of stayers. 
                                                 
13  In 2004, Italy was divided into 103 provinces. A much more demanding test would have 
consisted of the introduction of LLM fixed effects. However, statistical considerations prevent us 
from performing such a test: in our data; there are 80 LLMs and 99 municipalities, so inserting 
LLM fixed effects implies that the estimation of the parameter of PSI is based on average on 99/80 
= 1.238 municipalities per LLM. This clearly casts doubt on the statistical reliability of the test.   16
Furthermore, the interaction between our measure of public spending inefficiency 
and the dummy variable for movers is not significant. Therefore, we conclude that 
spatial sorting does not seem to be a relevant issue in our data. As a partial 
explanation for these findings, it should be recognized that the choice of location 
is strongly driven by other factors such as family links, migration costs, 
employment relationships. 
3.3  Public spending: level, efficiency, and autonomy 
As we have seen above, spending efficiency contributes to an increase in the 
citizens’ propensity to pay taxes. However, individual tax morale is likely to be 
affected also by the level of public spending and by the degree of fiscal autonomy 
of municipalities. In particular, tax morale is expected to be higher where citizens 
see more benefits in return for their tax contributions (Alm et al., 1992a, 1992b). 
In addition, recent works have emphasized the role of fiscal autonomy in shaping 
individual tax morale. Güth et al. (2005) argue that the taxpayers exhibit less tax 
morale under centralized tax structures. Similarly, Torgler and Werner (2005) 
state that greater fiscal autonomy allows regions to spend the tax revenues 
according to local preferences and this, in turn, might have a positive impact on 
tax morale.
14 
In this subsection, we refine our findings by providing a more 
comprehensive analysis of the role of the public sector. In doing so, we assess 
how the level of public spending and the degree of fiscal autonomy, together with 
spending inefficiency, affect individual tax morale. Table 8 reports these further 
results. For the sake of simplicity, we report only the results on PSI and on the 
other two key variables, which are included separately in the first two columns 
and simultaneously in the third one. As expected, the coefficient on the level of 
public spending per capita enters with a positive sign, and it is significantly 
different from zero. On the other side, we find a weak positive relationship 
between fiscal autonomy and tax morale, thus partially confirming the results by 
Torgler and Werner (2005).
15 At the same time, the coefficient of public spending 
inefficiency remains negative and highly significant. 
It is also likely that individual sensitivity to municipal inefficiency 
changes with the level of public spending and the degree of fiscal autonomy. To 
investigate this issue, we divide the sample according to both the amount of public 
spending per capita and the index of fiscal autonomy. The last four columns of 
Table 8 report the results of these sample splits. The negative impact of PSI on 
individual tax morale is confirmed in the four sample splits. However, it is 
                                                 
14 At the same time, the degree of autonomy of the municipality may affect the efficiency of public 
spending through several channels. For example, a higher dependence on the central state may 
lower the incentive of local managers to efficiently spend the resources. Therefore, fiscal 
autonomy could be an important omitted variable that drives the observed association between tax 
morale and public spending efficiency. 
15  Fiscal autonomy is measured as the ratio between municipal tributary plus extra tributary 
revenues and total revenues.   17
significantly different from zero (and it has a higher magnitude) only for those 
municipalities that have lower public spending per capita or a higher degree of 
fiscal autonomy.
16 Our interpretation of these results is that citizens treated with a 
higher level of public spending are more satisfied with the fiscal exchange and 
therefore are less worried about spending efficiency. Conversely, living in a 
municipality with a lower level of public spending may generate resentment in the 
taxpayer because he considers the received quantity of goods and/or services 
inadequate with respect to his tax payment. As a reaction, the citizen is more 
willing to control how resources are spent and he becomes more sensitive to 
spending efficiency.  
As far as the second split is concerned, it is likely that higher local fiscal 
autonomy moves the government closer to the citizens, and this entails greater 
transparency for the relationship between inputs and outputs. Citizens attach more 
responsibility to municipalities when these rely more heavily on local resources, 
and react with lower tax morale when they perceive public spending as inefficient. 
3.4  Further robustness checks: measurement issues of tax 
morale and inefficiency 
The core of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between two variables 
that are not easily measurable. Consequently, this subsection is devoted to 
examine the validity of our measures and to check the robustness of our findings 
when different measures of both tax morale and public spending inefficiency are 
used. 
First let us consider tax morale. Since it is (inversely) correlated to 
underground economy and tax evasion, a natural test is to see if our measure 
satisfies these correlations.
17 Using region-level aggregate data, we find that this is 
the case as shown in Figure 3 (with respect to shadow economy) and in Figure 4 
(as regards tax evasion). Therefore our measure of tax morale seems to capture in 
a proper way the propensity to comply with fiscal obligations and it is strongly 
related to compliance behaviors. As a further robustness check, we separately 
consider each of the items used to build our measure of tax morale. We transform 
the items described in Table 1 with dummy variables that take the value 1 when 
the individual shows a high level of tax morality and 0 otherwise (see Table 9). 
The coefficient of public spending inefficiency has the expected sign, and it is 
significantly different from zero in almost all the specifications. In particular, as 
shown in column (1), a less efficient local authority negatively affects the 
individual propensity to pay for a ticket on public transport. Our results are 
confirmed also for the items in columns (2) to (4) that are closer to the definition 
of tax morale.  
                                                 
16 Some caution is needed in the interpretation of these results due to the smaller size of the 
samples. 
17 Similarly, Torgler (2005b), Alm and Torgler (2006), and Torgler and Schneider (2007) observe 
a significant negative correlation between tax morale and a shadow economy.   18
Turning to our measure of spending inefficiency, we start checking its 
validity with a simple test. We use data on citizens’ satisfaction with the services 
offered by the municipality where they live, taken from the 1993 issue of the 
SHIW. Respondents are asked about their degree of satisfaction on a (1–10) scale 
about a number of public goods, such as the functioning of the municipality’s 
offices, road circulation, waste collection and so on. For each individual, we 
average all these answers to obtain a measure of individual overall satisfaction, 
and then we regress it on the inefficiency index together with some individual-
level controls (income, age, sex, education, etc.). The OLS estimate of the 
inefficiency coefficient equals -0.398 (standard error = 0.180), thus indicating that 
higher inefficiency is significantly associated with lower satisfaction.
18 
However, we can not completely rule out the possibility that our results 
depend on some of the empirical choices we have made in the computation of 
efficiency measure. Therefore, we consider two alternative measures of public 
spending inefficiency by changing the number of public goods and the 
methodological approach (Table 10). First, we restrict the number of outputs to 
the seven that are mostly provided directly by the municipalities; specifically, we 
exclude nursery schools and waste collection that sometimes are outsourced to 
private companies. This exclusion is motivated by the fact that outsourcing of 
public services might affect our inefficiency measure. However, the latter 
continues to have a negative and significant impact on individual morale (column 
1). Finally, we provide a measure of efficiency that is calculated using a 
completely different approach – the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) – since 
the procedure chosen, as pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996), may 
affect both the shape of the efficiency distribution and the ranking of 
municipalities. The DEA, as opposed to a stochastic frontier, is a nonparametric 
approach and therefore it is less prone to misspecification. On the other hand, 
nonparametric models are more sensitive to outliers.
19 In these cases, the expected 
sign is positive because the DEA furnishes a measure of efficiency. Our results 
are qualitatively confirmed (column 2).  
4  Conclusions 
Tax evasion is pervasive in many countries and encouraging tax compliance is 
                                                 
18 Results are available from the authors upon request. Obviously this test is valid as long as 
inefficiency is strongly persistent over time, given that satisfaction is measured in 1993 and 
inefficiency is referred to the 2001–2004 period. However this seems to be a reasonable 
assumption and it is confirmed in our data: inefficiency has been separately re-estimated using 
cross-sectional data for 2001 and 2004, and the spearman rank correlation between the two 
indicators is equal to 0.64.  
19 The DEA has a further disadvantage with respect to stochastic frontiers: it requires a balanced 
panel, and this implies, in our case, a severe reduction of the number of observations. We choose 
the following strategy to partially solves this problem: we compute a municipal measure of 
efficiency for each year for which observations are available; then we assign to each municipality 
the mean of efficiency measures across years. See Lovell (1993) for a detailed review of the DEA.   19
one of the most debated issues for policy makers. However, the magnitude of the 
phenomenon implicitly defines the complexity of the issue and the difficulty of 
finding the right policy options. At the same time, the efficiency of public 
spending is becoming a more pressing policy challenge. Governments and local 
authorities have to deal with increased pressures on their budgets to ensure the 
fiscal discipline. In this paper, we examine whether encouraging a more efficient 
spending of public resources, apart from being a good policy goal per se, can 
contribute to an increase in the citizens’ propensity to pay taxes. 
We find that tax morale is higher when the taxpayer perceives and 
observes that the government is efficient; that is, it provides a fair output with 
respect to the revenues. This evidence can be interpreted in terms of a 
psychological contract between taxpayer and fiscal authorities in which the former 
punishes the local government when he observes that resources are not spent well. 
Therefore, encouraging more efficient spending of public resources has wider 
consequences and contributes to increasing the citizens’ propensity to pay taxes. 
This evidence does not seem to be driven by some confounding factor at the 
municipality level or by spatial sorting of citizens and proves robust when 
accounting for alternative measures of both inefficiency and tax morale. We also 
find that the negative effect of inefficiency is larger if the level of public spending 
is lower and/or the degree of fiscal autonomy is higher. We interpret the former of 
these differential effects as a form of substitutability between level and 
inefficiency of public spending and the latter as the effect of “proximity” between 
taxpayer and public sector.   20
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Items about public spirit and taxation
1 
 
(1) Do you think that “not paying for your ticket on public transport” is always justifiable, never 
justifiable, or justifiable to some extent? Please give your answer on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being 
“never justifiable” and 10 being “always justifiable,” and the numbers in between indicating various 
degrees of response. 
 
Here is a set of statements that some interviewees before you made about Italy’s tax system. To what 
extent do you agree with each of them? Please give only one answer for each statement: 1 = not at all, 2 
= very little, 3 = so-so, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = very much 
(2) “Paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship” 
(3) “Not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because it harms the whole 
community” 
(4) “It is right not to pay taxes if you think they are unfair” 
(5) “Even if someone thinks a tax is unfair, he/she should pay it first and then complain if necessary” 
 
(6) Do you think it would be a good thing if “tax inspections were made more often,” or not? Please 
answer using one of the following statements: 1 = Yes, I would like them to be done much more often 
because it’s the only way to stop tax evasion; 2 = Yes, I would like them to be done more often, but 
within limits, to stop the Government interfering too much in people’s lives; 3 = I think things are all 
right as they are; 4 = No, I wish they were done less often because the present level of control is already 
too great; 5 = No, absolutely not; I think they should be done less often. 
 
Source: SHIW (2004). 









Mean (st. err.) 
0.000 (1.430) 
By income quartiles:   
1° quartile  -0.378 (1.520) 
2° quartile  -0.085 (1.384) 
3° quartile  0.109 (1.364) 
4° quartile  0.330 (1.360) 
By level of education:   
At most compulsory school  -0.159 (1.424) 
Diploma 0.205  (1.410) 
University degree  0.461 (1.353) 
By professional condition:   
Employees 0.084  (1.444) 
Self-employed -0.187  (1.411) 
By geographical area:   
North 0.146  (1.400) 
Center 0.156  (1.388) 
South -0.306  (1.450) 
# observations  3,798 
Source: SHIW (2004).   23
 
Table 3: Expenditures and output indicators 
Expenditure for:  Output: 
Public street lighting  Number of lighting points 
Technical office  Building permits released  
Local police  Kilometers covered 
Nursery school  Students enrolled in nursery school 
Waste collection  Tons of waste collected 
Road conditions and traffic  Kilometers of local roads 
Electoral service  Persons enrolled in electoral list 
Registry office  Number of certificates released 
National service  Persons enrolled in national service list 
Source: Italian municipalities’ balance sheet accounts. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable  Mean (standard deviation) 
   
Public spending inefficiency  1.81 (0.378) 
   
Individual characteristics:   
Age  56.83 (15.773) 
Female  0.40 (0.488) 
With a diploma (upper secondary school)  0.29 (0.454) 
With a university degree  0.09 (0.281) 
Log of disposable income  10.09 (0.659) 
Self-employed  0.10 (0.300) 
Participation in social activities  0.14 (0.348) 
Leftist orientation  0.73 (0.444) 
Movers  0.34 (0.472) 
   
Economic and social variables at the local level   
Log of GDP pro capita in the LLM  -2.10 (1.544) 
Firms with less than 10 employees in the LLM  53.15 (10.78) 
Percentage of services in the LLM  33.10 (5.493) 
Log of population in the municipality  10.34 (1.753) 
Percentage of foreign people in the municipality  0.04 (0.027) 
Percentage of young people (less than 15) in the municipality  0.14 (0.028) 
Electoral participation in the LLM (general elections 2001)  82.01 (5.801) 
Percentage of graduates among residents in the municipality  7.31 (3.276) 
Percentage of people engaged as volunteers in the nonprofit sector in the LLM  0.07 (0.053) 
   
Other variables from the municipal balance sheets   
Log of public expenditure per capita  6.65 (0.296) 
Financial autonomy  0.67 (0.131) 
   
Source: SHIW (2004) for individual data; Istat for economic and social variables; Italian municipalities’ balance 
sheet accounts for local public finance variables. 
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Table 5: Determinants of tax morale 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Public spending inefficiency  -0.767***  -0.793***  -0.751***  -0.764***  -0.775*** 
  (0.274) (0.266) (0.271) (0.268) (0.257) 
Age    0.036* 0.033* 0.035*  0.039** 0.035* 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Age  squared/100  -0.025 -0.023 -0.024  -0.028* -0.025 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Log of disposable income  0.242**  0.226**  0.234**  0.238**  0.213** 
  (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.091) 
Self-employed  -0.203 -0.263 -0.203 -0.139 -0.201 
  (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) (0.158) (0.158) 
Female    -0.159 -0.159 -0.139 -0.171 -0.151 
  (0.109) (0.112) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) 
Upper secondary school  0.189** 0.197**  0.170*  0.187**  0.178* 
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.096) 
University degree  0.210*  0.232*  0.173  0.172  0.161 
  (0.127) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131) (0.143) 
Regional fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Occupation  fixed  effects  YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector of econ. activity fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Area of birth fixed effects    YES      YES 
Participation in social activities      0.366**    0.345** 
     (0.149)    (0.140) 
Leftist  orientation      0.466***  0.450*** 
      (0.123)  (0.121) 
Observations  1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported in brackets; they are adjusted for clustering at the 
municipal level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   25
 
Table 6: Exploiting local-level determinants 
  Local-level control  Public spending 
inefficiency 
    
Log of GDP pro capita in the LLM  -0.054  -0.807*** 
  (0.056) (0.258) 
Percentage of services in the LLM  -0.024*  -0.779*** 
  (0.014) (0.249) 
Log of population in the municipality  0.005  -0.770*** 
  (0.080) (0.277) 
Percentage of young people in the municipality  -8.019*  -0.754*** 
  (4.864) (0.259) 
Percentage of foreign people in the municipality  -0.123  -0.774*** 
  (5.142) (0.258) 
Percentage of graduated people in the municipality  0.036*  -0.849*** 
  (0.021) (0.264) 
Electoral participation in the LLM  0.004  -0.776*** 
  (0.025) (0.263) 
Share of people engaged as volunteers in the nonprofit sector in the LLM  -0.034  -0.847*** 
  (0.030) (0.265) 
Province fixed effects  YES  -0.810* 
   (0.463) 
Province fixed effects plus all other local-level controls  YES  -1.027*** 
   (0.574) 
Observations  1,115 
The specification includes all the individual variables reported in table 5 column (5), whose results are not reported for 
simplicity. The first column contains the estimates for each of the additional controls; the second column reports the estimates 
for public spending inefficiency. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported in brackets; they are 




Table 7: Controlling for spatial sorting 
  Additional controls  Public spending 
inefficiency 
    
[subsample of only stayers]  -  -1.027*** 
   (0.326) 
[subsample of only stayers with selection a la Heckman]  -  -1.011*** 
   (0.227) 
Mover [whole sample]  -0.011  -0.799*** 
  (0.155) (0.267) 
Mover * public spending inefficiency [whole sample]   0.026  -0.808*** 
  (0.081) (0.255) 
    
The specification includes all the individual variables reported in table 5 column (5), whose results are not reported for 
simplicity. The number of stayers in the sample is 674. The exclusion restriction for the Heckman specification is inheritance 
of home of residence. The first column contains the estimates for the additional controls; the second column reports the 
estimates for public spending inefficiency. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported in brackets; 
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Table 8: Exploiting balance sheet variables 
  Split of the sample  
by LPS 
Split of the sample  














LPS e FA 
High LPS  Low LPS  High FA  Low FA 
           
Public spending inefficiency  -0.830***  -0.794***  -0.853*** -0.549 -1.093**  -1.031**  -0.554 
  (0.257) (0.256) (0.253) (0.408) (0.468)  (0.442)  (0.492) 
Level of public spending  0.741**    0.769*** 0.612  0.843 0.237 0.742 
 (0.289)    (0.305)  (0.801)  (1.107)  (0.824)  (0.494) 
Index of fiscal autonomy    1.661 1.781* 1.583 0.935  3.970  -1.587 
    (1.035) (0.974) (1.478)  (2.919)  (3.269)  (2.760) 
Observations  1,115 1,115 1,115  555  561 562 553 
The specification includes all the individual variables reported in table 5 columns (5), whose results are not reported for simplicity. 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported in brackets; they are adjusted for clustering at the municipal level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 9: Controlling for various definitions of tax morale 




is a basic 
duty” (2) 
“not paying 
taxes is a 
crime” (3) 
“paying taxes 
even if they are 
unfair” (4) 





           
Public spending inefficiency  -0.133** -0.127* -0.144**  -0.138***  -0.048  -0.227*** 
 (0.064)  (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.085) 
Age    0.005 0.006 0.009  0.000  0.003  0.014** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Age squared/100  -0.002  -0.005 -0.007  -0.001  -0.002 -0.010* 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Log of disposable income  0.055* 0.035  0.024  0.069***  0.040*  0.010 
 (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.029) 
Self-employed -0.016  -0.131** -0.056  -0.020  0.043  -0.189** 
 (0.057)  (0.066)  (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.052)  (0.077) 
Female   0.007  -0.083**  -0.085*** -0.002  -0.006  -0.035 
 (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.039) 
Upper secondary school  -0.022  0.099** 0.049  0.035  -0.024  -0.011 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.033) 
University  degree  0.005 0.024 0.081  0.017  -0.004 0.040 
 (0.048)  (0.073)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.059) 
Regional fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Occupation fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Sector of econ. act. fixed eff.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Area of birth fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Particip. in social activities  0.007  0.119***  0.095**  0.048  0.031  0.115** 
 (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.053) 
Leftist orientation  0.096**  0.034 0.082***  0.084***  0.010  0.118*** 
 (0.038)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.038) 
Observations  1,115 1,115 1,115  1,115  1,115  1,115 
(1) “Not paying for the ticket on public transport” is never justifiable. – (2) High agreement with “paying taxes is one of the basic duties of 
citizenship”. – (3) High agreement with “not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because it harms the whole 
community”. – (4) High disagreement with “it is right not to pay taxes if you think they are unfair”. – (5) High agreement with “even if 
someone thinks a tax is unfair, he/she should pay it first and then complain if necessary”. – (6) High agreement with “tax inspections be 
done much more often because it’s the only way to stop tax evasion”. 
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported in brackets; they are adjusted for clustering at the municipal level. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   27
 
 
Table 10: Controlling for various measures of public spending inefficiency 
 Stochastic  frontier 
with 7 outputs 
DEA 
with 9 outputs 
    
Public spending (in-)efficiency (1)  -0.060**  2.868** 
 (0.024)  (1.369) 
Age   0.035*  0.035* 
 (0.018)  (0.019) 
Age squared/100  -0.024  -0.024 
 (0.015)  (0.016) 
Log of disposable income  0.212**  0.238** 
 (0.090)  (0.097) 
Self-employee -0.216  -0.189 
 (0.163)  (0.167) 
Female   -0.134  -0.158 
 (0.107)  (0.108) 
Upper secondary school  0.185*  0.198** 
 (0.099)  (0.100) 
University degree  0.155  0.148 
 (0.143)  (0.143) 
Regional fixed effects  YES YES 
Occupation fixed effects  YES YES 
Sector of econ. act. fixed effects  YES YES 
Area of birth fixed effects  YES YES 
Participation in social activities  0.366***  0.349** 
 (0.139)  (0.137) 
Leftist orientation  0.444***  0.456*** 
 (0.124)  (0.128) 
Observations 1,115  1,115 
(1) Our key explanatory variable is public spending inefficiency when measured by stochastic frontier and 
public spending efficiency when measured by DEA. Thus, the expected sign is negative in the first column 
and positive in the second column. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are reported in 
brackets; they are adjusted for clustering at the municipal level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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